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THE HORIZONTAL EFFECT OF THE CHARTER: 
TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF HORIZONTALITY AS A STRUCTURAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE? 
 




This article analyses the main debates over the application of the Charter to disputes between private 
parties and assesses the ways in which the case law over the last ten years has responded to them. The 
article goes on to propose an alternative schema, whereby horizontality can be understood as a structural 
principle of EU fundamental rights adjudication on its own terms, rather than as an extension of the direct 
effect doctrine. It is argued that a self-standing principle of horizontality with equally valuable – yet 
operationally distinct – direct, indirect, and state-mediated manifestations, could respond more 








I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The horizontal effect doctrine has seen a recent revival in the case law of the European Court of Justice 
(‘CJEU’). A series of key rulings on the horizontal effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (hereafter ‘Charter’) have addressed important methodological (Egenberger) and 
substantive (Bauer) issues in respect of the application of fundamental rights to disputes between private 
parties.1 In turn, these cases have renewed the possibility of a coherent approach towards the horizontal 
effect doctrine under the Charter and justify a closer look at its present state of development and possible 
future directions. This article aims, firstly, to analyse the application of horizontal effect to the Charter 
and, then, to offer a tentative structural framework for addressing its remaining challenges. It is argued 
that constitutional space can be carved out for a self-standing principle of horizontality as an essential 
part of EU fundamental rights adjudication, rather than as an extension to private parties of the direct 
effect formula. 
 At a first stage, the article discusses the key qualities of the horizontality debate in human rights 
and comparative constitutional law and highlights the ways in which this debate informed the 
interpretation of the Charter (Part II). It then goes on to provide the reader with an overarching narrative 
for what may at times appear to be a casuistic and highly technical line of case law over the last ten years 
(Part III). Through an analysis of recent judgments, it will be argued that the binding Charter has 
significantly improved the Mangold jurisprudence regarding the horizontal direct effect of EU 
fundamental rights.2 However, the case law also reveals that the CJEU continues to use a justificatory 
apparatus which is unduly reliant on the direct effect concept, with problematic side-effects for 
fundamental rights of three kinds: conceptual (Part IV.A), procedural (Part IV.B), and remedial (Part 
IV.C).  
                                                     
* I am grateful to the CYELS editors and the anonymous reviewers for thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. Any 
errors are mine alone. 
1 Egenberger, C-414/16, EU:C:2018:257; Bauer, C-569/16 and C-570/16, EU:C:2018:871; IR, C-68/17, 
EU:C:2018:696; Cresco, C-684/16, EU:C:2019:43. Max-Planck, C‑684/16, EU:C:2018:874; CCOO, C-55/18, 
EU:C:2019:402. For a detailed account of the case law see also E Muir, ‘The Horizontal Effects of Charter Rights 
Given Expression to in EU Legislation, from Mangold to Bauer’ (2019) 12(2) REAL 185. 
2 Mangold, C-144/04, EU:C:2005:709. 
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 The end of a decade of binding application of the Charter provides an opportunity to reflect on 
the case law and to recalibrate our understanding of horizontality in response to its shortcomings. To this 
end, Part V argues that there is an independent role for horizontality as a structural principle of 
constitutional adjudication, which would enable a more principled organisation under the Charter of the 
key ways in which fundamental rights infiltrate intersubjective disputes: state-mediated effect (strong 
protective duties on public authorities); indirect effect (comprising both consistent interpretation by 
national courts and the interpretation of other fields of EU law in the light of fundamental rights by the 
CJEU); and direct effect. It is argued that this view of horizontality would support a fuller commitment 
to the application of the Charter in horizontal cases, not merely based on the principles of effectiveness 
and uniformity traditionally associated with the direct effect concept, but also based on the normative 
identity that might eventually be ascribed to horizontality as a constitutional principle in its own right. 
 
II. LINKING THE DEBATE ABOUT THE HORIZONTAL DIRECT EFFECT 
OF THE CHARTER WITH THE BROADER CONCEPTUAL 
CHALLENGE OF THE HORIZONTAL EFFECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The case law relating to the binding Charter has so far revealed that at least three provisions thereof can 
have horizontal direct effect:3 Article 21 (non-discrimination);4 Article 31 (the right to fair working 
conditions including paid annual leave);5 and Article 47 (the right to effective judicial protection).6 By 
contrast, Articles 267, 278, and 389 on respect for people with disabilities, the right to information and 
consultation within the undertaking, and consumer protection, respectively, lack the possibility of 
producing horizontal direct effect as such. The status of other rights remains undecided, with the position 
being particularly abstruse in certain cases. For example, while Article 28 on collective bargaining and 
action has been analysed in Opinions of Advocates General in horizontal situations, no specific 
pronouncement has been made on its potential to generate horizontal direct effect, in a final ruling.10  
 That only three provisions of the Charter have been found to be horizontally directly effective is 
in some respects underwhelming, yet not entirely surprising, when taking into account the relevant 
constitutional context. The question of the Charter’s horizontality occupied an important place in the 
academic commentary following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and there was extensive debate 
over the Charter’s potential to produce direct effect in disputes between individuals, in the same way as 
Treaty provisions.11 In particular, while the Defrenne jurisprudence had already promised that certain 
rights, such as the right to equal pay, could be invoked in horizontal disputes, there was vehement 
opposition both within and outside the CJEU to the idea that the rights protected in the Charter should 
give rise to obligations for private parties because Article 51(1) of the Charter, which regulates the 
Charter’s scope of application, is addressed to ‘the EU institutions and to the Member States only when 
they are implementing EU law’ and does not mention private entities.12  
                                                     
3 Case law last revised 1 May 2020. 
4 Kücükdeveci, C-555/07, EU:C:2010:21; Egenberger; IR; Cresco (n 1 above). 
5 Bauer, EU:C:2018:871; Max-Planck, EU:C:2018:874; CCOO, EU:C:2019:402 (see note 1 above). 
6 Egenberger, EU:C:2018:257; IR, EU:C:2018:696 (see note 1 above). 
7 Glatzel, C-356/12, EU:C:2014:350, para 78. Glatzel is a vertical case, but it is clear from the CJEU’s reasoning 
in this paragraph that the provision is uninvocable altogether (ie in both vertical and horizontal situations). 
8 Association de Médiation Sociale (‘AMS’), C-176/12, EU:C:2014:2, paras 45-49.  
9 Smith, C-122/17, EU:C:2018:631, para 49. See also the Opinion of Advocate General Bot in this case, 
EU:C:2018:223. 
10 See, eg Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Laval un partneri, C-341/05, EU:C:2007:291, paras 76, 191; 
Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Prigge, C-447/09, EU:C:2011:321, paras 41-46; cf Opinion of 
Advocate General Trstenjak in Rosenbladt, C-45/09, EU:C:2010:227, para 27.  
11 Defrenne, C-43/75, EU:C:1976:56, para 39. 
12
 C Ladenburger, ‘FIDE Conference 2012 Institutional Report’ (2012) XXV FIDE Congress, Tallinn, 30 May – 
2 June 2012, pp 34-35; Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Dominguez, C-282/10, EU:C:2011:559, paras 
80-83; M De Mol, ‘Kücükdeveci: Mangold Revisited – Horizontal Direct Effect of a General Principle of EU Law’ 
(2010) 6 EuConst 302; K Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8 
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To my mind, the textual reason for this initial rejection of horizontality was not convincing in itself. Such 
arguments had never resonated with the CJEU, which had famously found in Defrenne that 
 
The fact that certain provisions … are formally addressed to the Member States does not 
prevent rights from being conferred at the same time on any individual who has an interest in 
the performance of the duties thus laid down. … In fact, since Article [157 TFEU] is mandatory 
in nature, the prohibition on discrimination between men and women applies not only to the 
action of public authorities, but also extends to all agreements which are intended to regulate 
paid labour collectively, as well as to contracts between individuals.13  
 
The weakness of the textual argument against horizontal direct effect was compounded by the absence 
of its explicit refutation in the Charter, at a time when the doctrine was already a well-established facet 
of the direct effect of EU law. As Advocate General Cruz Villalón would later note in his seminal 
Opinion in AMS, ‘since the horizontal effect of  fundamental rights is not unknown to European Union 
law, it would be paradoxical if the incorporation of the Charter into primary law actually changed that 
state of affairs for the worse.’14 Indeed, the Charter reproduces rights which were previously found to 
have horizontal direct effect, such as the right to equal pay now protected in Article 23 thereof, while its 
Preamble can also be interpreted as embracing the potential for horizontality in a general sense, insofar 
as it states that the enjoyment of the rights protected in this instrument ‘entails responsibilities and duties 
with regard to other persons, to the human community, and to future generations.’  
 Furthermore, such a reading of the Charter would be in line with a broader tendency towards 
setting up human rights obligations for non-state actors within international, regional, and national legal 
systems over the last three decades.15 For example, questions of private ownership and horizontal effect 
now feature centrally in analyses of the practice of UN treaty bodies,16 while attempts at holding 
multinational corporations to account have largely coincided with the Charter’s drafting and 
development as a binding instrument.17 Similarly, a remarkable proliferation of horizontal effect in 
regional human rights instruments and national constitutions both within and outside Europe can be 
observed since the 1990s and early 2000s, ie around the time of the Charter’s proclamation.18 While 
                                                     
EuConst 375, para 11; A Bailleux, ‘La Cour de justice, la Charte des droits fondamentaux et l’intensité normative 
des droits sociaux’ (2014) 3 Revue de droit social 283, p 305. For an overview, see Opinion of AG Bot in Bauer, 
C-569/16, EU:C:2018:337, para 77. 
13 Defrenne, EU:C:1976:56, paras 31-39. 
14 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Association de médiation sociale, C-176/12, EU:C:2013:491, 
paras 34-35. 
15 See, eg, P Alston ‘The “Not-a-Cat” Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-
State Actors?’ in P Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (OUP, 2005), p 3; A Clapham, Human Rights 
Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP, 2006); JH Knox, ‘Horizontal Human Rights Law’ (2008) 102 (1) AJIL 1; 
H Dagan and A Dorfman, ‘Interpersonal Human Rights’ (2018) 51 Cornell Int’l LJ 361. 
16 See, eg, M Scheinin, ‘How to Improve the Human Rights Committee Draft General Comment on Freedom of 
Assembly’, Just Security, 23 February 2020, <https://www.justsecurity.org/68559/how-to-improve-the-human-
rights-committee-draft-general-comment-on-freedom-of-assembly/> accessed 20 June 2020; L Lane, ‘The 
horizontal effect of international human rights law in practice: A comparative analysis of the general comments 
and jurisprudence of selected United Nations human rights treaty monitoring bodies’ (2018) 5 (1) EJCLG 5. 
17 See, eg, the history of the draft treaty on business and human rights, recently culminating in the ‘Revised draft 
of a legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises’, 16/07/2019 
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/OEIGWG_RevisedDraft_LBI.pdf>: J 
Ruggie, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business And Human Rights’ (2008) 3 Innovations: 
Technology, Governance Globalization 189. 
18 On regional systems, see, eg: D Spielmann, L’effet Potentiel de la Convention Européenne des Droits de 
l’Homme entre Personnes Privées (Bruylant, 1995); F Coomans, ‘The Ogoni Case Before the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 749; TM Antkowiak, ‘Remedial Approaches to Human Rights 
Violations: the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond’ (2008) 46 CJTL 351. For comparative analyses 
of national laws, see, eg: G Brüggemeier, A Colombi Ciacchi and G Comandé (eds), Fundamental Rights and 
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these parallel constitutional conversations admittedly do not feature in accounts of the drafting process,19 
it would be puzzling to assess the horizontal effect of the Charter as if it were wholly separable 
conceptually from these developments. Indeed, the insistence upon scope limitations, such as Article 
51(1) of the Charter,20 can be seen as exemplifying a foundational concern with the horizontal effect of 
fundamental rights at large, which has been evident in its application across different legal orders and, 
as such, deserves somewhat lengthier attention. This broader disenchantment with horizontality could be 
described in a twofold manner as a fear of excessive judicialisation, on the one hand, and as a fear of 
‘rights inflation’, on the other.21 While these strands of critique are not conceptually sourced in the 
Charter, the Charter provides fertile ground for reviving, in the first case and, in the second case, applying 
them to EU law. 
 As the first aspect of the critique of horizontality goes – the fear of excessive judicialisation – 
horizontal effect taps into a judicial tendency to ‘totalise’ and to expand into the political realm.22 This 
concern can be dubbed the democratic case against horizontal effect: it embodies questions of legal 
uncertainty and legitimate expectations, prejudice to autonomy and private freedom and, crucially, 
judicial interventionism on account of rights. It is predicated, in other words, upon the argument that 
horizontal effect encourages judges to leave the realm of interpretation and to enter the realm of arbitrary 
law-creation. This critique has applied to horizontal effect in both its direct and in its indirect 
manifestations and has transcended nearly all constitutional contexts in which horizontality is 
employed.23 It is perhaps most tellingly encapsulated in its earliest contemporary iteration: a body of 
critical literature from the 1960s that lamented the German Constitutional Court’s development of its 
own version of horizontal or ‘third party’ effect (Drittwirkung) since the Lüth judgment.24 As EW 
Böckenförde’s famous critique of that judgment goes, the infiltration of private law with fundamental 
rights – or the ‘conflation of law with values’ – is problematic because it necessarily involves the 
development of constitutional priorities going beyond the scope of legitimate judicial choices.25 As 
recently put in his obituary, ‘should liberty always be prioritized over equality? Could one develop 
reliable criteria for exceptions to this rule?’ – if no reliable means can be found to assess and re-apply 
the relevant hierarchies between competing rights, the result is nothing but ‘judge-made law’.26 
 This line of critique of horizontality is not unknown to EU law or traceable to the creation of the 
Charter per se. Rather, it has been strongly present in EU case law on horizontal direct effect, if not 
already since Defrenne (a judgment considered so far-reaching that the CJEU took the unusual step of 
limiting its temporal effect), at least since Mangold.27 In affirming the right not to be discriminated 
against on grounds of age in a private employment context through a values-based language of rights 
                                                     
Private Law in the European Union (CUP, 2010); S Gardbaum, ‘The "Horizontal Effect" of Constitutional Rights’ 
(2003) 102(3) Michigan Law Review 387. The horizontal effect of the UK Human Rights Act 1998 in particular 
coincided with the Charter. For a restatement and analysis of this debate, see: G Phillipson and A Williams, 
‘Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional Constraint’ (2011) 74(6) MLR 878. 
19 L Goldsmith, ‘A Charter of Rights, Freedoms, and Principles’ (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 1201, pp 
1209-1213, where only Council of Europe instruments are discussed. 
20 The broader competence limits enshrined in Article 52(1) of the Charter and the distinction between rights and 
principles made in Article 52(5) would also fall within this category of overarching ‘scope’ objections. 
21 I borrow the term from K Möller ‘Proportionality and Rights Inflation’ in G Huscroft, B Miller and G Webber 
(eds), Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning (CUP, 2014), p 155. 
22 M Kumm, ‘Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and the 
Constitutionalization of Private Law’ (2006) 7(4) GLJ 341, pp 350-369. Kumm explains the critique, before 
rebuking it. 
23 S Gardbaum, ‘The "Horizontal Effect" of Constitutional Rights’ (2003) 102(3) Michigan Law Review , pp 387- 
410. 
24 Lueth – BverfGE 7, 198 (1958), 205. 
25 E W Böckenförde ‘Grundrechte als Grundsatznormen’ in E W Böckenförde (ed), Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie 
(Suhrkamp, 1991), p 185; See further J Van Der Walt, The Horizontal Effect Revolution and the Question of 
Sovereignty (De Greuter, 2014), pp 361-2. 
26
 M Künkler and T Stein, ‘An Obituary for Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde (1930-2019), Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, 
May 11 2019, available at <http://www.iconnectblog.com/2019/05/an-obituary-for-ernst-wolfgang-bockenforde-
1930-2019/> accessed 1 May 2020. 
27 See note 2 above. 
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qua general principles of EU law despite the absence of textual basis for this point and the fact that earlier 
case law had excluded this possibility, Mangold gave special ammunition to the critique of 
judicialisation. The critique was, indeed, voiced in terms as strong as calls to ‘Stop the European Court 
of Justice!’,28 while even those more sympathetic to the bearing of the ruling lamented the incoherence 
of the case law29 and the resulting prejudice for private individuals wishing to plan their lives cognisant 
of the legal consequences of their actions.30  
 The second objection identified above, that of rights inflation, emerges in EU law primarily 
because of the Charter’s recognition of social and economic rights in addition to civil and political rights. 
Like the critique of judicialisation, the expansion of constitutional protection to social and economic 
rights is at times perceived as a direct attack on the principles of autonomy and private freedom that civil 
and political rights seek to guarantee.31 Thus, as Nolan has observed, the liberal objection to the 
horizontal application of fundamental rights and the incorporation into bills of rights of social and 
economic rights have strikingly similar undertones.32 Justiciable social and economic rights involve 
‘redistribution and the alteration of the status quo both in terms of the allocation of power and other 
resources and in terms of pre-existing legal frameworks and relationships’.33 For this reason, particularly 
in horizontal cases, social and economic rights ‘raise similar concerns for those who argue that decisions 
in relation to distribution and law-making should be the sole preserve of democratically elected 
representatives’.34  
 Moreover, beyond the idea that human rights should remain limited to negative freedom, 
concerns over the inflationary potential of horizontality have been voiced from another angle of human 
rights theory, too. The inclusion of social and economic considerations in human rights adjudication is 
seen as objectionable because it is thought to trivialise human rights with matters of material welfare, 
such as better working conditions, annual leave or, as Letsas has provocatively put it, ‘the right to sleep 
well’.35 Such inclusion contributes, as this argument goes, to unwarranted questioning of the foundation 
of human rights in dignity and relativises their need for universal protection.36 This account includes 
both a critique of the content-based extension of human rights to matters of material wellbeing through 
social and economic rights and their ad personam extension to certain non-state actors, more generally. 
Unlike states (or, at least, well-meaning states), most non-state actors operate on the basis of private, 
rather than public, interests. As such, extending human rights obligations horizontally requires 
safeguards against self-interest considerations that could commoditise the application of human rights.37 
 The former side of the inflation critique was expressed most powerfully in respect of the Charter 
by Advocate General Trstenjak in her Opinion in Dominguez, where she pleaded with the CJEU not to 
expand its horizontal effect case law through the Charter to social rights, thus circumventing the basic 
                                                     
28 R Herzog and L Gerken, ‘Stop the European Court of Justice,’ EU Observer, 10 September 2008, 
<https://euobserver.com/opinion/26714> accessed 1 May 2020. 
29 M Dougan ‘In Defence of Mangold?’ in A Arnull et al (eds), A Constitutional Order of States: Essays in EU 
Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Hart Publishing 2011), p 219; Editorial comments, ‘Horizontal Direct Effect – 
A Law of Diminishing Coherence?’ (2006) 43(1) Common Market Law Review 1. 
30 PP Craig, ‘The Legal Effect of Directives: Policy, Rules and Exceptions’ (2009) 34 European Law Review 349, 
p 355. See also PP Craig, ‘The ECJ and Ultra Vires Action: A Conceptual Analysis’ (2011) 48(2) Common Market 
Law Review 395. 
31 See, eg, J Matthews, Extending Rights’ Reach: Constitutions, Private Law, and Judicial Power (OUP, 2018). 
32 A Nolan, ‘Holding Non-State Actors to Account for Constitutional Economic and Social Rights Violations: 
Experiences and Lessons from South Africa and Ireland’ (2014) 12(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 
61, p 64. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 G Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP, 2007), p 129. See 
also JW Nickel, ‘Rethinking Indivisibility: Towards A Theory of Supporting Relations between Human Rights’ 
(2008) 30(4) Human Rights Quarterly 984, pp 991ff.  
36 See further Möller (See note 21 above) for a detailed account and rebuttal. 
37 S Besson ‘Comment Humaniser le Droit Privé sans Commodifier les Droits de l'Homme’ in F Werro (ed), 
Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme et le Droit Privé (Stämpfli, 2006), p 30; J Thomas, Public Rights, 
Private Relations (OUP, 2015), pp 5-7 and chapter 5. 
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contract that fundamental rights create between a state and its citizens.38 The latter concern – that of 
commoditisation – was carefully highlighted by Advocate General Jääskinen in his Opinion in Google 
Spain, where he pointed out the difficulties of allowing corporate actors, such as private search engines, 
to conduct the balancing exercise between different rights, such as one person’s right to private data over 
another’s freedom of expression and information (respectively protected in Articles 8 and 11 of the 
Charter).39  
 In short, then, while the horizontal direct effect of the Charter might at first glance appear to be 
a niche or technical matter of EU law, the broader constitutional intricacies of horizontality in the field 
of fundamental rights can be recognised in two of its most contested aspects: its scope of application and 
the status of social and economic rights. Along with the well-known (but not necessarily settled) 
parameters of the EU direct effect doctrine, these issues form the conceptually trying background against 
which the last ten years of case law on the Charter must be read.   
  
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF HORIZONTAL DIRECT EFFECT IN THE 
CJEU’S CASE LAW 
 
The CJEU was first asked to clarify its case law on horizontal direct effect in Kücükdeveci, one of the 
first cases it decided after the entry into force of the binding Charter.40 There, the CJEU emphatically 
reaffirmed its position in Mangold, finding that fundamental rights are not sourced in directives. While 
they may acquire ‘specific expression’ therein, they are in themselves non-derogable, primary sources 
of EU law, requiring observance by public and private parties alike.41 Nevertheless, Kücükdeveci was in 
some respects a cautious ruling, rather than a big proclamation of a constitutional moment for the Charter. 
As the case concerned non-discrimination in the calculation of financial compensation for dismissal, thus 
bearing significant similarities with Mangold, it was difficult to see how the CJEU could have decided 
this case differently. Moreover, as Peers has noted, to go in a different direction would have been 
substantively ‘absurd’, as it would have created a hierarchy between gender and other protected 
characteristics, such as age.42 Yet, continuing to be couched in the language of general principles of EU 
law,43 the case did not do much to clarify the impact of the Charter on horizontal direct effect and, 
particularly, whether it could extend to other provisions.  
 As highlighted in Part II, the debate about the Charter’s horizontality was never primarily about 
non-discrimination. It was the question of whether horizontal direct effect would apply to other rights 
and, particularly, to provisions that may not have previously held the status of general principles, such 
as the social and economic rights of the Solidarity chapter, which was most clearly at stake. But while 
the CJEU was asked early on about the horizontal direct effect of social and economic rights (most 
notably, the right to paid annual leave in Dominguez), it did not address the matter head-on until 
Association de Médiation Sociale (‘AMS’).44 In the AMS judgment, the CJEU confirmed in unequivocal 
terms that certain provisions of the Charter, such as Article 21, could be applied horizontally, but found 
that provisions such as the one at issue in this ruling, Article 27 on the right to information and 
consultation within the undertaking, could not. The relevant directive did not lend this right sufficiently 
specific expression to allow its invocation conjunctively, either.45  
 The ruling in AMS was critically received.46 Not only had it sidestepped a detailed and 
technically elaborate Opinion by Advocate General Cruz Villalón coming to the opposite conclusion, 
                                                     
38 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Dominguez, C-282/10, EU:C:2011:559, paras 128-135. 
39 Opinion of AG Jääskinen in Google Spain, C‑131/12, EU:C:2013:424, paras 133-134. 
40 Albeit that the facts predated it.  
41 Kücükdeveci, EU:C:2010:21, para 21. 
42 S Peers, ‘Supremacy, Equality and Human Rights: Comment on Kücükdeveci (C-555/07)’ (2010) 35(6) European 
Law Review 849, pp 855-856. 
43 On general principles, see further Emily Hancox’s contribution in this volume. 
44 See note 8 above. 
45 Ibid, para 49.  
46 See, eg, E Uría Gavilán, ‘¿Los principios de la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea pueden 
ser invocados en litigios entre particulares?: comentario a la Sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia (gran sala) de 15 de 
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but it had seemingly internalised the inflation critique whilst displaying thin human rights reasoning to 
support the distinction between Article 27 and Article 21. The legacy of AMS was deeply felt in 
subsequent case law, which continued to rely extensively on the general principles terminology, rather 
than using the Charter as the key source of rights protection.47 It meant that whereas a step had been 
taken towards affirming horizontal direct effect for some of the Charter’s provisions within the first five 
years of its application as a binding instrument, both the contours of horizontal direct effect and the 
process whereby it could be claimed remained unclear. Nevertheless, a turn in the case law can be 
identified from 2018 onwards, which marks a more thorough and consistent position. Through cases 
such as Egenberger and Bauer,48 the CJEU has in my view clarified the case law in two important 
respects, albeit that it has not fully revised it.  
 First, these cases mark a beneficial methodological shift. Unlike Mangold and Kücükdeveci, 
where little attention was paid to the duty of consistent interpretation, the CJEU has now clarified that, 
even in cases where direct effect is available, the correct approach for national courts is to consider 
consistent interpretation as far as possible in line with Pfeiffer, in the first instance.49 Only where this is 
impossible should resort to direct effect be had. This is undoubtedly correct from a procedural point of 
view, particularly within a composite constitutional order. In practice, the difference between direct and 
indirect effect is minimal for the individuals claiming the relevant right.50 However, starting from 
indirect effect allows the basic structure of private law to be retained by being infiltrated with, rather 
than superseded by, constitutional law. This is especially significant when it comes to directives, as 
indirect effect enables national courts to represent within national implementing measures the provisions 
of the Charter and to offer effective reparation in the manner that national law most suitably provides for 
without short-circuiting domestic systems of remedies with the direct effect of the constitutional 
instrument, unless this is necessary. 
 The second important change effectuated by this line of case law is substantive, as the Bauer 
ruling explained the CJEU’s position regarding the status of social and economic rights. In Bauer, 
Advocate General Bot sought to bridge the gap that had emerged between Egenberger and AMS. He 
urged the CJEU not to allow fundamental social rights to become ‘a mere entreaty,’51 regretting that his 
own earlier Opinion in Kücükdeveci had been reinterpreted in the AMS judgment in a manner that 
restricted the invocability of these rights. He thus suggested that AMS should be confined to its facts, or 
at least to rights which are conditional on ‘national laws and practices.’52 In turn, the CJEU should affirm 
in unequivocal terms the possibility of any of the other fundamental rights protected in the Charter to 
                                                     
enero de 2014 en el Asunto C-176/12 Association de médiation sociale’ (2014) 34 Revista General de Derecho 
Europeo ; E Frantziou, ‘Case C-176/12 Association de Médiation Sociale: Some Reflections on the Horizontal 
Effect of the Charter and the Reach of Fundamental Employment Rights in the European Union’ (2014) 10 
European Constitutional Law Review 332; N Lazzerini, ‘Case C-176/12, Association de médiation sociale v Union 
locale des syndicats CGT and Others, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 15 January 2014’ 
(2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 907; C Murphy, ‘Using the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Against 
Private Parties after Association De Médiation Sociale’ (2014) European Human Rights Law Review 170; S Platon, 
‘L'Invocabilité Horizontale des Normes de Droit de l'Union Européenne: Un Pas sur Place, Un Pas en Avant, Deux 
Pas en Arrière - (CJE, grande chambre, 15 janv. 2014, aff. C-176/12)’ (2015) 584 Revue du marché commun [online 
version]. 
47 As Ward rightly points out, references to the Charter have been routinely omitted even in respect of non-
discrimination. See, eg, the ruling in Dansk Industri (DI), C-441/14, EU:C:2016:278. Tellingly, even Article 23 on 
equal pay has not been mentioned, with art 157 TFEU continuing to be used instead: A Ward, ‘The Impact of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on Anti-Discrimination Law: More a Whimper than a Bang?’ (2018) Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Leagal Studies 32, p 42. 
48 See note 1 above. 
49 Pfeiffer, C-397/01 to C-403/01, EU:C:2004:584, para 115. 
50 S Drake, ‘Twenty Years After Von Colson: The Impact of “Indirect Effect” on the Protection of the Individual’s 
Community Rights’ (2005) 30(3) European Law Review 329; E Engle, ‘Third Party Effect of Fundamental Rights 
(Drittwirkung)’ (2009) 5(2) Hanse Law Review 165, pp 169-70. 
51 Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Bauer, C-569/16, EU:C:2018:337, para 95, citing R Tinière, ‘L’invocabilité 
des principes de la Charte des droits fondamentaux dans les litiges horizontaux’ (2014) 14 Revue des droits et 
libertés fondamentaux. 
52 Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Bauer, C-569/16, EU:C:2018:337, paras 74-76. 
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produce horizontal direct effect, where necessary.53 In its judgment in Bauer, the CJEU agreed,  
clarifying that the AMS ruling should not be read as generalised scepticism over social and economic 
rights. Rather, all Charter provisions which are framed in a mandatory and unconditional manner can in 
principle be invoked as such, both vertically and horizontally. While this was not the case for Article 27 
in AMS because that provision is subject to national laws and practices, this did not apply to Article 31, 
which could therefore enjoy horizontal direct effect.54  
 Some questions remain open. Most importantly perhaps, it is unclear whether further legislation 
or prior general principle status could redress the ‘deficiency’ in the invocability of rights which are 
conditional on further legislation and principles under Article 52(5) of the Charter.55 The question is not 
settled with Bauer and would be worth clarifying, in view of the fact that Bauer did not address the extent 
to which such provisions engage the duty of consistent interpretation and did not expressly associate the 
qualification by national laws and practices with Article 52(5). The conditionality category indeed 
appears to be wider than the principles category, covering nearly all of the social and economic rights 
protected in the Solidarity chapter (other than Article 31), but also provisions such as Article 9 on the 
right to marry and Articles 10(2) on conscientious objection and 16 on the freedom to conduct a business. 
Since some of these rights may have had general principle status in the past and were, substantively, 
involved in aspects of recent case law,56 explaining the effects of conditionality would be important in 
order to maintain consistency.57  
 But while some issues naturally require further elaboration, it follows from the above discussion 
that, overall, the CJEU has begun addressing two core problems that initially plagued the application of 
the Charter to private parties: internal methodological inconsistencies and the status of social and 
economic rights. The case law today contains several statements affirming that Article 51(1) of the 
Charter does not preclude the possibility of horizontal direct (or indirect) effect.58 Further, all those 
provisions of the Charter which set out a mandatory right can enjoy horizontal direct effect, provided 
they meet a key criterion of the direct effect formula: that of unconditionality (although it is, of course, 
clear that this qualification still adversely impacts social and economic rights). Thus, to some extent, the 
CJEU’s position has started to speak neatly to the immediately reactive aspects of the critiques identified 
in Part II, which had largely followed Mangold, Dominguez and, more recently, AMS. Whatever one’s 
views might be about the merits of horizontal direct effect, there are undeniable benefits in terms of legal 
certainty to knowing that the Charter has the potential to enjoy it, following a reasonably clear method 
of consistent interpretation in the first instance, and disapplication if required. However, it is questionable 
whether the case law addresses the deeper layers of the judicialisation and inflation critiques, as Part IV 
goes on to show. 
 
IV. ONGOING CHALLENGES FOR HORIZONTALITY UNDER THE 
CHARTER  
 
The starting point of direct effect created important possibilities for horizontality in the field of EU 
fundamental rights, becoming a key part of the discourse of rights and obligations that individuals derive 
                                                     
53 Ibid. 
54 Bauer, EU:C:2018:871, paras 84-86. 
55 Article 52(5) provides that principles ‘may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, 
in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts 
and in the ruling on their legality.’ Glatzel (n 7 above) paras 74-78 and AMS (n 8 above) paras 45-47 had suggested 
that principles and conditional rights could be invoked if implemented in further legislation, but seemed to set a 
particularly high threshold for this to happen (not met in either case). 
56 See, eg, IR, EU:C:2018:696, where the right to marry was involved, even though the CJEU only dealt with the 
case via Article 21 of the Charter. 
57 See further on this the pending cases in MH Müller Handel, C-341/19 and Bosolar, C-366/19, which concern the 
application of 16 of the Charter. 
58 Eg, Egenberger, EU:C:2018:257, para 77; Max Planck, EU:C:2018:874, para 77; Bauer, EU:C:2018:871, para 
87. 
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from EU law.59 However, in my view, this starting point presents three overarching challenges which 
justify questioning its structural appropriateness for the Charter, despite the advances made in the case 
law over the last few years. The first of these challenges is conceptual and concerns the narrow remit of 
the EU understanding of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights – a point that relates not just to direct 
effect, but to the interpretation of different provisions of the Charter and, as such, the relationship 
between direct and indirect effect (Section A). Secondly, being set up based on a content-based 
attribution process (the direct effect conditions), the horizontal effect of the Charter can appear devoid 
of addressee-based factors, such as causality and private power (Section B). Finally, a remedially 
problematic interrelationship has emerged between the principles of direct/indirect effect/state liability, 
on the one hand, and the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the Charter, on the other (Section 
C).   
 
A. A constitutional picture bigger than direct effect 
 
Whereas the question of horizontality has historically been treated as separate from statutory 
interpretation, this understanding risks underplaying the broader effects that the Charter has had on non-
state actors as part of the CJEU’s interpretation of secondary legislation. Could we not also describe re-
readings of EU secondary law in the light of fundamental rights and applied in a dispute between private 
actors as ‘horizontal’, even if these do not strictly concern the direct effect formula? This was, perhaps 
most illustratively, the bearing of the CJEU’s ruling in Google Spain. The CJEU found:  
 
Inasmuch as the activity of a search engine is […] liable to affect significantly […] the 
fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data, the operator of the search 
engine as the person determining the purposes and means of that activity must ensure […] that 
the guarantees laid down by the directive may have full effect and that effective and complete 
protection of data subjects, in particular of their right to privacy, may actually be achieved.60 
 
For this reason, Articles 6, 7, 12, 14, and 28 of Directive 95/47, which did not explicitly lay down a right 
for the data subject to request that the data processor remove their personal data, nevertheless had to be 
interpreted as if that right had been written into the legislation, in order to ensure the effective protection 
of the fundamental rights to privacy and the protection of private data enshrined respectively in Articles 
7 and 8 of the Charter. Indeed, the CJEU also found that in assessing a data removal request ‘a fair 
balance should be sought in particular between [the legitimate interest of the public in accessing 
information] and the data subject’s fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.’61 The case 
thus resulted in significant obligations being placed on the data processors to accommodate and to 
balance the relevant rights appropriately in their interactions with individuals. 
 Google Spain exemplifies the operation of a different kind of indirect or ‘radiating effect’62 of 
fundamental rights (eg of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter) upon other fields of law (eg the Data Protection 
Directive 95/47), which shows that the horizontal application of the Charter has been far more wide-
ranging and consequential in practice than the case law on horizontal direct effect discussed in Part III 
might suggest. It may indeed be argued that the obligation of consistent interpretation imposed on 
national courts appears comparatively weak against this strong, purposive type of indirect effect at the 
EU level, which openly supplements the legislation with a fundamental rights obligation in order to 
account for its constitutional significance. To draw a sharp distinction between the application of 
horizontal direct effect and statutory interpretation would thus hide from view a broader realm of 
horizontal human rights jurisprudence, which escapes the conundrum of non-horizontality of directives 
that drove much of the former case law, yet can still result in extensive, immediate, and largely 
unforeseeable obligations for private actors (often through directives). Google Spain is but an illustrative 
                                                     
59 Van Gend en Loos, C-26/62, EU:C:1963:1. 
60 Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, para 38.  
61 Ibid, 81. 
62 I borrow the terminology of the German Constitutional Court in Lueth (n 24). See further G Helleringer and K 
Garcia, ‘Le rayonnement des droits de l’Homme et des droits fondamentaux en droit privé’ (2014) 66 (2) Revue 
Internationale de Droit Comparé 283. 
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example: the CJEU has interpreted the meaning and relevance of the Charter to EU secondary legislation 
applicable in se or through national implementing measures to private relations in a variety of contexts, 
concerning privacy more broadly,63 as well as other rights, such as religious freedom64 and the freedom 
to conduct a business.65 
 Presenting a stark contrast to the relatively limited fundamental rights reasoning provided in the 
case law on horizontal direct effect, this line of cases lays bare a key problem: that seeking to apply 
horizontal effect to the Charter by patching up the direct effect jurisprudence, thus continuing to refer to 
the pre-Charter direct effect conditions, can unduly proceduralise the concept of horizontality. Doing so 
engenders possibilities of incoherence between the outcome of cases concerning statutory interpretation 
and horizontal direct effect for substantively similar issues.66 Comparing the CJEU’s religious freedom 
cases such as Egenberger, Cresco, and IR (where the direct horizontal effect of Article 21 of the Charter 
was invoked) and the handling of the same substantive right in case law concerning the interpretation of 
the Equality Directive (ie cases concerning indirect or radiating effect lato sensu), such as Bougnaoui 
and Achbita,67 provides a clear illustration of this risk. Not only is it difficult to reconcile the CJEU’s 
willingness to affirm non-discrimination against private employers in the former line of cases but to 
employ a more restrictive interpretation of secondary law protecting the same right in the latter. At the 
same time, the Achbita case in particular embodied balancing exercises between different rights (Articles 
10 and 21 of the Charter on the one hand, and Article 16 of the Charter, on the other), which cannot be 
neatly distanced from the CJEU’s findings in its direct effect case law.68 Can the CJEU’s extensive use 
(or ‘abuse’, as Weatherill puts it)69 of the Article 16 protection of contractual freedom in Achbita be 
reconciled with the CJEU’s finding in Bauer that conditionality upon national laws and practices reduces 
a right’s invocability? While the CJEU has not explicitly made a finding regarding the horizontal direct 
effect of Article 16, its broader case law suggests significant potential for that provision to produce strong 
forms of indirect horizontality, with the same practical effects for private actors as direct effect.70 
 This normative incoherence is proving to be a key stumbling block for national constitutional 
courts having to reconcile these cases at the national level, as the currently pending preliminary reference 
in Müller Handel indicates.71 The case concerns the compatibility with the Charter of company rules on 
religious observance (religious attire) set by a private undertaking. After seeking clarification of the reach 
of Article 10 of the Charter in the light of Bougnaoui/Achbita, the national court actively queries how it 
ought to interpret the relationship of these cases with Article 16 of the Charter, following Bauer: 
 
In the examination of an instruction based on an internal rule of a private undertaking which 
prohibits the wearing of prominent, large-scale signs of religious, political or other philosophical 
beliefs, must national rules of constitutional status which protect freedom of religion be set aside 
because of primary EU law, even if primary EU law, such as, for example, Article 16 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, recognises national laws and practices? 
  
It follows that a key tenet of the judicialisation critique of horizontality, namely the uncertainty resulting 
from the absence of an overarching narrative about the different ways in which fundamental rights reach 
                                                     
63
 Eg, Connolly, C‑274/99P, EU:C:2001:127; Österreichischer Rundfunk, C-465/00, EU:C:2003:294. 
64 Bougnaoui, C-188/15, EU:C:2016:553; Achbita, C-157/15, EU:C:2017:203; Jehovan todistajat, C-25/17, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:551. 
65 Bougnaoui, EU:C:2016:553 and Achbita, EU:C:2017:203; Alemo-Herron, C-426/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:521. 
66 See further E Muir, ‘The Horizontal Effects of Charter Rights Given Expression to in EU Legislation, from 
Mangold to Bauer’ (2019) 12(2) REAL 185, p 200ff. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Achbita, EU:C:2017:203, paras 37-38. 
69 S Weatherill, ‘Use and Abuse of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights: On the Improper Veneration of 
‘Freedom of Contract’’ (2014) 10 European Review of Contract Law 157. 
70 For example, in Alemo-Herron, ECLI:EU:C:2013:521, para 31, a purposive interpretation of Article 16 resulted 
in the invalidation of a collective agreement concluded between a group of employees and their previous employer, 
for the benefit of a new employer. 
71 See note 57 above. 
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into intersubjective disputes, remains alive in this field, despite the fact that, as Part III highlighted, its 
horizontal direct effect has been employed in a relatively limited manner.72  
 
B. The limited potential of direct effect as a principle of attribution of responsibility for 
violations of fundamental rights 
 
A second important concern is the use of direct effect as the key principle of attribution of responsibility 
in horizontal disputes. One of the main reasons why horizontal direct effect is controversial is that, unlike 
its indirect counterpart, it creates a potentially wide-ranging form of ‘constitutional tort’ under the 
Charter.73 Despite allowing national courts to integrate the fundamental right into their interpretation of 
other private law in the first instance, the availability of direct effect in EU law remains, in comparative 
terms, wide-ranging. In particular, the method employed by the CJEU still creates an entitlement to 
disapplication whenever consistent interpretation is impossible, thus substituting the law ordinarily 
applicable to the private relationship with the claim under the Charter – that is, after all, the very nature 
and special significance of the direct effect concept. However, driven by needs of effectiveness and 
primacy, the direct effect question as construed in EU law is addressee-blind: it does not concern the 
type of private actor on whom an obligation may be imposed, but only the legal construction of the right 
being invoked, eg whether it is unconditional and, as President Lenaerts describes the process, there is a 
violation of its ‘essence.’74 In turn, while state liability remains a remedy that can be invoked 
subsequently by the violator to recover losses ensuing from having had to make good the violation of a 
fundamental right, its application under this schema takes the form of a fallback claim. This raises both 
practical and symbolic concerns of attributability of a constitutional harm to an appropriate actor within 
the EU constitutional order: first, the availability of state liability varies substantially across the Member 
States.75 Second, the current approach lacks a process for translating into private duties the fundamental 
rights designated in the Charter.76 
 The theme of attributability was compellingly analysed by Advocate General Bobek in Cresco.77 
In that case, which concerned discrimination in the workplace through the recognition of only some 
religious holidays, the Advocate General was mindful of ascribing the violation of Article 21 of the 
Charter to a private party because the source of their conduct was the national implementing legislation, 
rather than individual choice. Advocate General Bobek put forward various reasons (moral, structural 
and ideological) why the state, rather than private employers, should be considered primarily responsible 
for paying for violations of fundamental rights stemming from poorly drafted national law, arguing that 
factors such as the source of discrimination, fault for discrimination, and benefit accruing to the 
employer should be considered before being made responsible for repairing the harm suffered.78 As he 
put it, whereas ‘individuals may rely on Article 21(1) of the Charter […] to have incompatible provisions 
of national law set aside […], EU law does not require that the costs of State failure to ensure conformity 
of national law with the Charter be borne in the first instance by private employers applying that national 
law.’79 The CJEU did not follow the Opinion, finding the employer liable in line with the method 
                                                     
72 K Lenaerts, ‘Limits on Limitations: The Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU’ (2019) 20 German Law 
Journal 779, pp 788-792. 
73 A Nolan, ‘Holding Non-State Actors to Account for Constitutional Economic and Social Rights Violations: 
Experiences and Lessons from South Africa and Ireland’ (2014) 12(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 
61, p88; see also M Pieterse, ‘Indirect Horizontal Application of the Right to Have Access to Health Care Services’ 
(2007) 1 South African Journal on Human Rights 157, 162–163. 
74 See note 72 above. 
75 B van Leeuwen and R Condon, ‘Bottom Up or Rock Bottom Harmonization? Francovich State Liability in 
National Courts’ (2016) 35(1) Yearbook of European Law 229, p 231. 
76 J Thomas, Public Rights, Private Relations (OUP, 2015), pp 5-7 and chapter 5. 
77 Opinion of AG Bobek in Cresco, C-193/17, EU:C:2018:614; see also A Ward, ‘The Impact of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights on Anti-Discrimination Law: More a Whimper than a Bang?’ (2018) Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Leagal Studies 32, pp 55-56 and Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in AMS, C-176/12, 
EU:C:2013:491, para 79, where a parallel argument is made. 
78 Opinion of AG Bobek in Cresco, C-193/17, EU:C:2018:614, paras 173-185. 
79 Ibid, para 196. 
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expounded in Part III above. And yet, while there could be problems with the extensive use of the existing 
means of reparation through state liability upon which the Advocate General relied (a point explored 
further in Section C below), the suggestions made in the Opinion are noteworthy. Is it satisfactory that 
the answer EU law gives to breaches of fundamental rights by private parties can in principle always be 
the same as for a Member State, regardless of whether the addressee is a regulatory entity, corporate 
employer, or private person, and irrespective of the reasons for their conduct?  
 These points relate to the inflation critique of horizontality, insofar as they question the 
appropriateness of outsourcing the protective duties of the Member States to private actors, as well as to 
the judicialisation critique, insofar as they seek to carve out a space of private freedom within the remit 
of national law. They are neither abstract nor unlikely. On the contrary, they have seeped through 
important preliminary references that challenge the authority of the CJEU to make a finding of direct 
effect, such as Dansk Industri,80 while forming the basis of a still pending preliminary reference request 
in Bosolar. In that case, the national court asks: in a situation where a violation of Article 16 is likely to 
be found, should the violation be invocable against another private party directly, even if that party acted 
pursuant to the legitimate expectation that national law would be followed?81 These queries remind us 
anew of the problematic absence of a coherent doctrine of civil liability in EU law, already pointed out 
by Reich, as well as of EU law’s restricted notion of state liability as a public law remedy.82 
 
C. Effective reparation for violations of fundamental rights in horizontal disputes 
and the role of Article 47 of the Charter 
 
In addition to the broader conceptual and procedural challenges that arise as a result of the equalisation 
of the principle of horizontality with horizontal direct effect, a remedial question also arises, which 
concerns provisions that do not enjoy the possibility of direct effect.  
 All fundamental rights require a set of appropriate and adequately deterrent remedies to avoid 
becoming ‘theoretical and illusory,’83 even though not all rights are directly actionable against all actors. 
This principle is well-established in EU law.84 The Charter specifically enshrines it in Article 47, which 
provides that ‘everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has 
the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal’. Thus, the limitations otherwise built into the content 
of certain rights, such as conditionality upon national laws and practices or the restrictions on the 
justiciability of unimplemented principles set out in Article 52(5) of the Charter might shift the meaning 
of remedial effectiveness for these provisions, but do not wholly pre-empt the possibility of effective 
judicial protection. Nevertheless, since Egenberger, the CJEU has started unduly to associate the 
application of Article 47 with direct horizontal effect, with problematic side-effects.  
 While Article 47 is one of only three rights that have been found to be horizontally directly 
effective, none of the cases in which it was mentioned concerned it specifically. For example, in 
Egenberger, which involved discrimination against a non-believer applicant for a job with the 
Evangelical Church in Germany, the CJEU raised Article 47 of its own motion, following the Opinion 
of Advocate General Tanchev, where the point had first been made.85 The CJEU found that Article 47 
of the Charter applied to a dispute between private persons,86 was invocable ‘as such’,87 and the 
applicable provisions of the Charter – non-discrimination and the right to an effective remedy – required 
that non-discrimination be protected by any necessary means, including the disapplication of 
                                                     
80 See note 47 above. 
81 See note 57 above. 
82 N Reich, ‘The Interrelation between Rights and Duties in EU Law: Reflections on the State of Liability Law in 
the Multilevel Governance System of the Union: Is There a Need for a More Coherent Approach in European 
Private Law?’ (2010) 29(1) Yearbook of European Law 112, p 113. 
83 Airey v. Ireland (Application no. 6289/73) (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 305, para 24.  
84 Rewe-Zentralfinanz, C-33/76, EU:C:1976:188. 
85 Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev in Egenberger, C-414/16, EU:C:2017:851,para 54. 
86 Egenberger, EU:C:2018:257, para 49. 
87 Ibid, para 78. 
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incompatible national law.88 As this is an area already occupied in substance by Article 21, though, why 
was Article 47 of the Charter considered essential for this finding?  
 Safjan and Düsterhaus offer a convincing answer, which is that the CJEU is interpreting Article 
47 as enshrining a positive obligation for the Member States to legislate for the protection of fundamental 
rights.89 However, effective judicial protection is normally a supplementary claim prompted by the 
failure to protect substantive rights.90 It could, of course, be engaged in a scenario such as the one above 
once it became clear that the violation of Article 21 would not be effectively remedied, eg because of 
procedural bars to claiming it. In Benkharbouche, for instance, where Article 47 was applied by a national 
court, the procedural aspect was relevant: the case related to violations of fundamental employment 
rights by a foreign state, which was considered a private employer for the purposes of UK labour law 
but was at the same time immune from prosecution, so that the applicant’s substantive rights could not 
be affirmed.91 Yet, in the absence of such an element, the state duty to protect fundamental rights relates 
to each of the Charter’s substantive provisions. To associate this duty with Article 47 of the Charter alone 
could end up diluting the character of Article 47 as a procedural right, while at the same time giving the 
impression that non-directly effective provisions of the Charter are not subject to the principle of 
effective judicial protection at all. 
 Indeed, the most significant drawback in the CJEU’s use of Article 47 does not lie in cases like 
Egenberger, but in the (non)application of Article 47 to different aspects of the Charter. When it comes 
to provisions which are not directly effective, the CJEU has continued to rely on state liability in 
damages, without referencing state liability as a subset of the effective remedies required under Article 
47, as well without acknowledging the limitations of state liability in rectifying certain violations of 
fundamental rights. For example, in Smith, a case which concerned the implementation of EU law on 
consumer protection in the field of insurance policies (the principle of consumer protection being 
enshrined in Article 38 of the Charter), the CJEU did not refer to Article 47, pointing instead to state 
liability in damages under the Francovich formula.92 But while state liability might have been 
appropriate on the facts of Smith,93 it should not be assumed to be an effective remedy for all provisions 
of the Charter, including provisions for which no other remedy has been made available. Due to the 
strictness of the relevant conditions on causal link and measurability, state liability in damages is not 
always a secure remedy compared to direct and indirect effect.94 While it can work for some pecuniary 
losses, it does not translate well to cases where the violation is difficult to quantify, such as cases 
concerning associational rights. This problem is exemplified in AMS, where the same approach was 
followed.95 The damage suffered by failing to secure information and consultation within the undertaking 
cannot easily be measured, as it is not causally traceable in materially inferior working conditions (this 
would entail proving that there would have been successful information and consultation and not mere 
exercise of the right). It would have been impossible to claim damages before French courts following 
                                                     
88 Ibid, paras 59 and 81. 
89 M Safjan and D Düsterhaus, ‘A Union of Effective Judicial Protection: Addressing a Multi-level Challenge 
through the Lens of Article 47 CFREU?’ (2014) 33(1) Yearbook of European Law 3, 17. On the use of Article 47, 
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90 Klass and Others v Germany (Application no. 5029/71) (1978), 2 E.H.R.R. 14, para 69; Kudla v Poland 
(Application no. 30210/96) (2000) 35 E.H.R.R. 198, para 151. 
91 Benkharbouche [2015] EWCA Civ 3, [2015] 3 WLR 301, at [80ff]. 
92 Smith, EU:C:2018:631,para 56.  
93 Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Smith, C-122/17, EU:C:2018:223, paras 48ff. 
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 S Prechal ‘EC Requirements for an Effective Remedy’ in J Lonbay and A Biondi (eds), Remedies for Breach of 
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the AMS judgment,96 even though France takes a relatively generous attitude towards state liability, 
compared to other Member States.97  
 The case law thus problematically represents state duties to ensure the effective reparation of 
some Charter provisions in horizontal disputes, which resonates with concerns of inconsistency and, 
particularly, with the debate on social and economic rights, as the set of rights most deeply affected by 
uninvocability. While, in view of Article 52(5) and/or their conditionality on national laws and practices, 
some of these rights may entail thinner core obligations, they are still subject to the Article 47 need of 
some judicial protection – a feat in which the principle of state liability can fail. Due to the way in which 
the CJEU reads Article 47, it appears to refrain from stipulating positive duties for these provisions, in 
line with their limitations. However, this overlooks other pertinent considerations, eg, the possibility and 
extent of judicial scrutiny of the relevant national laws and practices by national courts. Could there then 
not be a role for Article 47 in respect of these violations of the Charter, too, albeit in a manner that 
accommodates their conditionality? It is indeed noteworthy that, while the CJEU’s reliance on Article 
47 in Egenberger seemed to follow the letter of the Advocate General’s analysis, AG Tanchev has in 
fact consistently sought the observance of Article 47, even for provisions that may not meet the direct 
effect conditions as such. In his Opinion in OTP Bank, for instance, he refers to Egenberger, arguing 
that Article 38 of the Charter should act as a minimum interpretive guide for secondary legislation and 
that it ‘would also be in tension with the right to effective judicial protection under Article 47 of the 
Charter, which confers rights on individuals which they may rely on before Member State courts, 
including the context of disputes between private parties’ if an interpretation compatible with that right 
were not found.98 A similar note was made by AG Bobek in TÜV.99 However, the right to an effective 
remedy was not used in either of these judgments.  
 
V. HORIZONTALITY AS A STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE 
OF EU LAW WITH DIRECT, INDIRECT, AND STATE-MEDIATED 
DIMENSIONS  
 
The preceding analysis argued that important steps have been taken under the Charter, when looked at 
from the angle of internal coherence of the Mangold/non-horizontality of directives case law. However, 
the case law continues to display foundational challenges, when looked at from the angle of broader 
constitutional coherence, qua legitimacy of the interpretive and remedial implications of the CJEU’s 
findings. This section proposes an alternative structure for horizontality as a constitutional principle with 
direct, indirect, and state-mediated manifestations that could address some of these ongoing problems. 
 The principle of horizontality rests upon a unitary conceptual foundation, namely that rights 
protected as ‘fundamental’ are legally relevant in intersubjective disputes, but it is operationally varied. 
More specifically, in ideal theory, horizontality can operate on three main tiers: state-mediated effect; 
indirect effect of varying intensities; and, ultimately, direct effect.100 These three constructions are 
mostly ‘outcome-neutral’ for applicants, in that they all have the potential of resulting in effective 
reparation.101  However, none of them is in itself conceptually complete and each captures a distinct 
aspect of the operation of fundamental rights within the legal system: direct horizontality is addressed to 
private actors themselves, indirect horizontality is addressed to courts in their interpretive function, and 
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state-mediated horizontality is addressed to state authorities bound to ensure ensuring that non-state 
action does not endanger the protection of fundamental rights.102  
 Further distinctions can be drawn within the above schema, with commentators such as Alison 
Young having previously identified as many as seven sub-types.103 These further distinctions, which 
principally define the stronger and weaker types of indirect horizontality in more detail, could prove 
useful in a multi-level constitutional order like the EU, so as to further elucidate the role of the CJEU 
and of national courts in applying the principle. As my purpose here is to sketch a broad systematisation 
of horizontality, though, I shall confine my analysis to the direct, indirect, and state-mediated effect 
categories. While these three dimensions are loosely present in the three main doctrines of EU law in 
this field (direct and indirect effect and state liability), as Part IV has shown, these doctrines do not 
currently succeed in representing the interpretive aspects of the principle of horizontality nor do they 
appropriately set up protective duties for the Member States. Recognising the self-standing value of each 
of the dimensions, ie reversing the prevalent narrative whereby horizontality is conceptualised as part of 
the direct effect meta-norm, could facilitate an important conversation about which constitutional 
actor(s) ought to be imbued with horizontal obligations and how these obligations should be delivered. 
 First, while a three-tiered vision of horizontality still includes direct effect, ie the disapplication 
of incompatible law and its supersession with fundamental rights vis-à-vis other private actors, it does 
not operate automatically where indirect effect is unavailable, but as a question of suitability. In other 
words, the difference between the CJEU’s current approach and the proposed three-tiered system is that 
the latter looks to the structure of the duty, and not just to the content of the right. It thus distinguishes 
the normative question of horizontal applicability from the remedial one (horizontal application through 
one or more of the three dimensions). A finding that I should not suffer pay discrimination on account 
of gender, for instance, would require reparation through the fiat of one or more of the dimensions of 
horizontality mentioned above, but it need not amount to a finding that I am entitled to claiming this 
right against any employer at any time, even if this norm remains in principle capable of delivery in any 
of the three ways. Rather, an assessment of how the finding of horizontality would operate through each 
of the tiers by situating it within the type of private relationship in which the right is invoked would be 
necessary in order to identify which actor could best carry the burden of repairing the damage suffered 
(and why).  
 This approach would tackle the concerns of attributability raised by AG Bobek in Cresco, 
explained in Part IV.B above, as well as some of the broader questions of judicialisation and inflation 
discussed in Part II. For example, rendering direct effect limitable for actor-based and not just norm-
based reasons would allow for considerations such as private autonomy and legitimate expectations to 
feature more centrally in the CJEU’s reasoning, in line with a clearer understanding of core principles of 
civil liability for violations of fundamental rights.104 At the same time, recognising the exceptional 
character of direct effect in the fundamental rights context (as opposed to affirming its availability for 
only some rights) would avoid routinising the emancipatory symbolism it has, whenever it is affirmed. 
Horizontal direct effect can, indeed, be a powerful means of redressing de facto inequalities in the 
enjoyment of de jure equally attributed rights – a key concern in instances of long-standing social 
subjugation of vulnerable groups (for reasons of gender or otherwise) and in cases that involve 
ungovernable forms of private power, more generally. It is perhaps less convincing if habitually used as 
a means of responding to legislative errors or reinterpreting existing rights in light of changing social 
circumstances, where the state-mediated and indirect manifestations, respectively, may offer 
constitutionally more harmonious alternatives. 
 Secondly, most provisions of the Charter might be thought to have some – albeit varying – 
indirect or radiating horizontal effect, whether it be in the CJEU’s interpretation of secondary legislation 
(what I have argued already amounts to strong indirect effect at the EU level) or through the duty of 
consistent interpretation at the national level (a weaker form of indirect effect). The recognition of an 
EU-defined principle of indirect effect, which combines statutory interpretation in cases concerning 
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private action as well as its consistent interpretation counterpart at the national level, might not in itself 
resolve the inconsistencies in the treatment of substantively similar cases discussed in Part IV.A, but it 
would render such inconsistencies clearer, allowing them to be exposed, debated and, ultimately, 
resolved as the subject-specific case law on different Charter provisions builds up. Moreover, rather than 
viewing indirect horizontal effect as a step that national courts must take before unleashing the fully-
fledged potential of Mangold actions, it would enable a more rounded view of indirect horizontality as a 
shared judicial duty across EU courts at all levels.  
 But how, one might ask, could we respond to the difficult cases where indirect effect cannot go 
far enough and direct effect might not be an appropriate avenue, either? Or, indeed, to cases where the 
other dimensions alone do not capture the complexity of a violation? In this regard, a fully developed 
understanding of the potential of state-mediated effect is required. Rather than being understood solely 
as state liability in damages, state-mediated forms of horizontality can act in two further ways. First, 
state-mediated effect itself entails positive obligations. As Part IV.C highlighted, these obligations are 
currently brought into horizontal disputes through Article 47 of the Charter, which does not always 
correspond to the provision’s functions. The affirmation of positive obligations as part of the 
horizontality analysis nevertheless remains important as a supplementary claim to the application of 
other dimensions, such as direct effect, in recognition of the fact that state and non-state fault can be at 
play at once. There, the delineation of a protective duty could prove to be key to subsequent violations: 
where that duty has not been met, reliance could then convincingly be made upon the availability of 
effective remedies under Article 47 of the Charter against the state. This would also more neatly separate, 
as Part IV.C suggested, the question of legislative obligations from the question of effective remedies in 
general, recognising that further triggers might exist under Article 47 for the core or essential content of 
any Charter provision.105 Secondly, state-mediated effect offers a meaningful response to situations 
where horizontality is claimed as a shield against another private actor when both direct and strong forms 
of indirect effect are impossible. This scenario is reminiscent of CIA Securities and Unilever.106 In this 
type of case, national courts qua public authorities are prevented from allowing a benefit to accrue to a 
private actor because of incompatible legislation. While this outcome is similar to disapplication, it is 
justified not from within the private relationship, but by the constitutional duty of the courts as public 
authorities bound to respect the Charter. 
 In turn, the three-tiered approach described above could reduce the stark difference that has 
emerged in the horizontal effect case law between Charter provisions which are invocable as such and 
provisions which cannot be so invoked. Of course, it cannot be denied that limitations such as 
conditionality on national laws and practices and Article 52(5) would still be likely to lead the CJEU to 
exclude mechanisms of disapplication of national law, which could be associated with direct effect and 
strong forms of indirect effect (such as the reading in of legislative intent) for such provisions. Similarly, 
whilst some types of state-mediated effect may be possible, they may have to be based on incidental 
effect or executive inaction, as opposed to positive obligations to legislate, as that would go against the 
grain of Article 52(5). Still, as the possibility of viable forms of indirect horizontal effect and state 
liability is missing from the case law on many of the affected rights so far, such as information and 
consultation within the undertaking and the rights of persons with disabilities, an explicit recognition of 
even these weaker forms of horizontality could mark an important constitutional change towards 
effectiveness for these provisions.  
 Before concluding, it is worth anticipating a potential objection to my proposal, which could be 
that it avoids the trickier parts of the judicialisation or inflation objections discussed in Part II, rather 
than addressing them. In offering an overall structure for a self-standing, constitutional principle of 
horizontality, it is not my intention to suggest that this would fully succeed in resolving deep normative 
disagreements over the desirability of horizontal effect altogether. Making sense of horizontality as a 
constitutional principle certainly also requires a vision for its conceptual foundation – be it to enhance 
equality, dignity or, say, market liberalism. While this question cannot be thoughtfully addressed in the 
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remaining space available,107 an assessment of the three dimensions would be pointless unless their 
application was tested against a legitimate overarching rationale. Indeed, it should not be assumed that 
horizontality as a principle is inherently positive or negative for the advancement of fundamental rights. 
One might recall the Irish experience of horizontality, for instance, where albeit initially used to guard 
individual autonomy (manifested, eg, in not being dismissed on account of a personal choice not to join 
a trade union),108 an assumption of a contestable dignitary foundation for all rights took the principle 
‘out of control’, as O’Cinneide notes, when it came to attributing obligations to vulnerable women to 
protect the right to life of the unborn– a position later overturned by the Supreme Court.109 In EU law 
terms, one might look back to the Viking saga (resonating more recently with the TSN ruling by analogy) 
as an example of horizontality being used to hamper, rather than to affirm, the protection of fundamental 
rights for the benefit of other constitutional values.110 This finding prima facie rested only on a re-
application of the Defrenne conditions, yet arguably had a different normative undercurrent in respect of 
the appropriate hierarchy between collective employment rights and market freedoms.  
 While they perhaps inevitably reveal some of my own preferences for the appropriate 
foundations of horizontality, these examples highlight the perennial relevance of the questions with 
which the main normative debates on horizontal effect start: that of which hierarchies of rights are the 
right ones and how new rights and shifting power relations should be represented within our 
constitutional order. The reason why, to my mind, a consistently applied structure such as the one 
suggested above remains significant in addition to these questions is two-fold. First, it would be overly 
simplistic to divorce the assessment of whether horizontal effect is appropriate in principle from that of 
which types of horizontal effect are appropriate. To do so would overlook that while, in abstract terms, 
challenges such as judicialisation and inflation are typified by direct effect, all forms of horizontality 
carry such concerns, but with respect to different constitutional interactions.111 Secondly, and perhaps 
more importantly, such a structure can embed into a procedurally stable legal practice the broader inquiry 
into whether horizontality should be available at all or for which rights – the answer to which, as the 




At just over ten years after the entry into force of the binding Charter, and nearly forty-five after the 
CJEU’s seminal ruling in Defrenne, it is clear that the CJEU is regaining a vigorous stance towards the 
horizontal effect of fundamental rights. While significant questions remain, the CJEU has offered redress 
for violations of fundamental rights by following a discernible logic and method. Nevertheless, the 
emphasis on direct effect and the fragmentation of the idea of horizontality by the relic of the non-
horizontality of directives continue to pose problems in this field. In light of these observations, this 
article suggested a structural re-evaluation of horizontality under the Charter as a self-standing, three-
tiered constitutional principle comprising direct, indirect, and state mediated manifestations. It was 
argued that understanding horizontality in this manner would lend coherence to the different types of 
emerging case law on the indirect application of the Charter to disputes between private parties; that it 
would ensure greater potential for meaningful reparation of horizontal harms for all rights; and, crucially, 
that it would more succinctly address questions of attribution of duties to different actors.  
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 This article did not attempt to imagine the application of the principle of horizontality for other 
areas of EU constitutional law. Whilst beyond the scope of the present study, however, such an analysis 
would be worthwhile, as a means of re-organising the complicated operation of horizontal effect in EU 
law, more generally. The proposal for an alternative constitutional structure of horizontality under the 
Charter made in this article also did not attempt to address the substance of the broader question of 
justification that the principle of horizontality raises in the field of fundamental rights, namely, for which 
purpose such rights should be applied to private relations. And yet, As Part V sought to explain, removing 
the focus from horizontal direct effect and placing it upon a principle of horizontality manifested in but 
not determined by its direct, indirect and state-mediated dimensions, could be a first step in assessing 
whether the overall role of horizontality in protecting fundamental rights is a felicitous one, rather than 
just being a means of outsourcing human rights or of commoditising them.  
 
 
 
 
